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Liability of a Carrier for Loss and Damage
to Interstate Shipments
Thomas R. Skulina*
T HE LAW governing the liability of a carrier for loss or damage to
interstate shipments is set out in the Carmack Amendment.1 Prior
to the enactment of this federal legislation, a body of law pertaining to
this subject developed in the common law. The present law evolved
from the earliest concepts of bailment relationship.- The early statutes
preserved many aspects of the common law. This article will refer to
common law principles but will not focus on law as it was prior to the
Carmack Amendment. This subject has been dealt with at length else-
where. 3
The need for federal legislation in the area of interstate commerce
should be apparent. Varying rules of many states would indeed confuse
the liability of the potentially numerous carriers involved in the move-
ment of a single carload of freight.
The problem of freight damage is a serious one. The vast amount of
tonnage which moves each year is staggering. Though many technical
advances have been made with respect to reducing damage in transit,
the human element still remains a source of accidents. In 1960, for ex-
ample, in a report by 107 rail carriers alone, representing 93.5% of
United States, Canadian and Mexican mileage, approximately $120 mil-
lion were paid in claims. In that year the number of new claims totaled
2,872,860. In 1964 the amount paid in claims climbed to $140 million.4
In view of the large number of claims processed by carriers in all
modes of transportation, it is imperative that the carriers be afforded
a clear law which will expedite the settling of these claims. This law
further must coincide with the general transportation policy of Congress.
Hence, when viewing the Carmack Amendment one must also look
at various other acts relating to carriers to obtain an understanding of
the tenor of transportation policy. Not only was Congress interested in
setting forth guidelines for liability, they also considered the problems
of discrimination; for example, by favoring one shipper over another in
* A.B., John Carroll Univ.; LL.B., LL.M., Western Reserve Univ. Practicing attorney
in Cleveland and counsel for Penn Central Railroad Company.
1 49 U.S.C. § 20 (11) (1964).
2 Holmes, The Common Law 180-205 (1881).
3 Lust, Loss and Damage Claims (2d. ed. 1919) but see, Oleck, Cases on Damages,
60, 63 (1962).
4 Circular No. FCD-1803, Association of American Railroads; 11 The Chronicle 222
(Aug. 1965).
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the area of freight claims a carrier could violate other parts of the Inter-
state Commerce Act.
5
One practical problem of determining liability arises over the nature
of interstate travel. Frequently several carriers are involved in a given
shipment. The shipper who sent out the load is usually not in a position
to be able to discover which of the involved carriers damaged his lading.
The carriers themselves might dispute whether the damage was caused
by a preceding or succeeding carrier in the chain of transportation. The
Carmack Amendment seeks to solve this problem. This Amendment was
enacted as a part of the Hepburn Act of 1906.6
Congressman Richardson, who spoke for the committee responsible
for the draft of the Carmack Amendment, stated:
We have made the initial carrier, the carrier that takes and re-
ceives the shipment, responsible for the loss of the article in way of
damages. We save the shipper from going to California or some dis-
tant place to institute his suit. Why? The reasons for inducing us
to do that were that the initial carrier has a through route connec-
tion with the secondary carrier, on whose route the loss occurred,
and settlement between them will be an easy matter, while the ship-
per would be at heavy expense in the institution of a suit.'
The Carmack Amendment was subsequently amended by the Cum-
mins Amendment of March 4, 1915,8 a law called the "Second Cummins
Amendment," 9 and by a number of later amendments that are not neces-
sarily called by name. 10 Thus, in reading court decisions the same law
might be called either the Carmack Amendment or the Cummins Amend-
ment.
As a result of these various changes in the law the shipper has ob-
tained a right of action against either the initial carrier or the delivering
carrier. How this right is enforced is the subject of this article.
Though this article is concerned with one amendment, it is impor-
tant to realize that it is merely a part of the Interstate Commerce Act 1
which dates back to 1887 and which has been amended on numerous
occasions.1 2 Inherent in the rationale behind the Act is its designed pur-
5 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1964); one such provision against discrimination is the Elkins Act,
49 U.S.C. § 6 (7) (1964).
6 34 Stat. 595; Miller, The Legislative Evolution of the Interstate Commerce Act 256
(1930 ed.).
7 40 Cong. Rec. 9580 (1906).
8 38 Stat. 1196; see also Miller, op. cit. supra note 6 at 257.
9 39 Stat. 441 (1916).
10 41 Stat. 494 (1920); 44 Stat. 835 (1920); 44 Stat. 1446, 1448 (1920); 46 Stat. 251
(1930); 49 Stat. 543 (1940); 54 Stat. 916 (1948); 62 Stat. 295 (1949).
11 49 U.S.C. (1964).
12 For a detailed discussion of the various periods of the Interstate Commerce Act
see, 1 Knorst, Interstate Commerce Law and Practice 51-200 (1953 ed.).
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LOSS OR DAMAGE ON SHIPMENTS
pose to promote harmonious interstate transportation and thereby aid
commerce. 13
The primary evil which the Act aimed at averting was the practice
of discrimination. In 1903 the Elkins Act 14 was enacted to give teeth to
the Congressional resolve to prohibit discrimination. Aside from the
sweeping purpose of the Elkins Act, various provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act pertain to specific aspects of potential discrimination; for
example, a law relating to rates.15
Thus, when any case involving freight damage to an interstate ship-
ment is read, the reader must keep in mind that the court is also con-
sidering the National Transportation Policy as set forth by Congress.
The Supreme Court referred to it as having the aim to thwart ". . . the
paramount evil chargeable against the transportation system of the
United States . . . ," namely, unjust discrimination.16
Prima Facie Case of Plaintiff
The Carmack Amendment did not create any new substantive rights
in the shipper. 7 It did, however, confer new remedial rights. Hence, in
order to see what is necessary to prove a prima facie case, the common
law rule must be reviewed.
Under the common law a carrier is liable as an insurer for loss to
those goods which it holds itself out to handle. 18 Inherent in the law at
its incipient stage was the principle that a carrier exercised a public em-
ployment for which it received compensation. The goods which it de-
livered were entrusted to it for transit. Once the shipper handed over
its lading it was not in a position to know precisely how it was being
handled. The law, therefore, developed a simple policy of holding the
carrier as an insurer against all events except acts of God and of enemies
of the King. This was considered reasonable by the English courts, other-
wise carriers could work out clandestine arrangements with third parties
to convert their shipper's goods and the shipper would be in a very un-
fortunate situation because of the obvious unequal access to informa-
tion. 19 Some other defenses were later allowed a carrier and will be dis-
cussed below.
The carriers, of course, mitigated the sting of being an insurer by
the adjustment of rates and various methods of limiting liability by con-
tract. Aside from the principle just mentioned, another principle should
13 Id. at 21.
14 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-3 (1964).
15 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1964).
1' A. L. Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 376 U.S. 375 at 384 (1964).
17 J&H Flyer Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 316 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1963).
Is Id.
19 Lust, op. cit. supra note 3, at 32.
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be viewed before the elements of a prima facie case are set out. This
principle affects the problem of "going forward" with the evidence.
While the first principle discussed deals with the burden of proof, this
latter one affects who must begin the presentation of evidence to a court.
The relationship between a shipper and a carrier is essentially a
bailor-bailee relationship. When such a relationship exists, the law recog-
nizes that as to the damage sustained, the bailee is in a better position
to know this than the bailor. The bailee, therefore, has the burden of
"going forward" with the evidence. The burden of proof, however, does
not shift and if the bailee can bring enough evidence to raise doubts, the
bailor does not sustain the burden of persuasion which rested with him
at the start of the trial.20
Under the common law, a plaintiff who is suing to recover damages
for goods lost or damaged by a carrier, establishes a prima facie case of
liability against such carrier where he shows that the goods were re-
ceived by the carrier in good condition, and upon delivery were either
missing or damaged. This proof, therefore, raises a presumption of
negligence upon the part of the carrier and is enough to present the
issues to a jury.21
This rule still prevails under the Carmack Amendment as amended.
22
If a shipper sues an initial or delivering carrier, then, even if he pleads
specific acts of negligence, as long as he shows an interstate shipment,
suit against the proper carrier, and the aforementioned aspects of a
prima facie case he will get to the jury.23
In establishing his case, the shipper must sustain the burden of
showing that the goods were received by the carrier in good condition.
His obligation as far as the loading is concerned depends upon the meth-
od of shipment he chooses. Where he has a movement characterized as
a "shipper's load and count" shipment, he then assumes the responsibility
of loading.24 Under these circumstances the shipper is liable for defects
in loading which are latent and cannot be observed or discovered by the
carrier through ordinary observation.2 5
If there is a misdescription in the bill of lading, in the absence of
fraud, the shipper or consignee merely has the obligation to pay an addi-
20 Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104 (1941).
21 5 Elliot, On Railroads 2738 (3d ed. 1922).
22 Missouri P. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134 (1946); Ohio law in accord may
be found in Grosjean v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 146 Ohio St. 643, 67 N.E. 2d 623 (1946).
23 Bob Bros. Constr. Co. v. Perry Heavy Haulers, 166 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1948); Snow-
den v. Tremont & G. R.R., 140 So. 122 (Ct. of App. La. 1932); cases turned, how-
ever, on improper loading by shipper.
24 49 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
25 Solway Metal Sales Ltd. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 344 F.2d 568 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
see also Miller, Law of Freight Loss and Damage Claims 351-72 (2d ed. 1961).
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tional charge in keeping with the tariff rate for the items actually shipped
but there will be no effect as far as liability is concerned. 26
The burden of the shipper to show that the goods were received in
good order is minimized where the bill of lading contains a recitation
that the lading is in apparent good condition. Hence, even where the
contents of a shipment were marked "shipper's load and count," the
shipper sustained the burden of establishing a prima facie case by intro-
ducing evidence that the bill of lading had a notation that the goods were
in good order. This was not rebutted by evidence that other items of
lading were also damaged. Thus, upon proving a damaged condition at
destination the shipper proved the two essential facts he had the burden
to prove.
27
Parol evidence, however, has been permitted to show a carrier had
not received a portion of a shipment even though it was listed on a
straight bill of lading which was received by the carrier.28 Though the
common law has simplified the burden of proof that must be borne by
the shipper, the basic theory of liability is founded in negligence. Hence,
a shipper who stipulated that the carrier was free of negligence suffered
a summary judgment in favor of the carrier.29 Though this was decided
as recently as 1961 there has been a significant change in the law which
would leave the aforementioned rule of law in doubt. This will be dis-
cussed in the section dealing with the carrier's defenses.
It has already been shown how liability is affected where the shipper
loads the shipment. There is also an effect upon liability where the con-
signee handles the shipment at the destination point. A shipment of mir-
rors was trucked from Louisville, Kentucky to Dayton, Ohio. Crates of
the mirrors were deposited at the loading platform of the plaintiff.
Thereafter, the plaintiff's employees moved them to the third floor of its
building and some time later the damage was discovered. Plaintiff intro-
duced no evidence that handling by its employees was proper. It was
held that though the general rule is that a prima facie case is made
where it is shown that goods were delivered to the carrier in good con-
dition and delivered to the consignee in damaged condition, where the
goods after receipt by the consignee are transported by his employees to
another part of his premises and the damage is there discovered, the
general rule has no application where there is no evidence as to the care
exercised by such employees.3 0
26 Armour Research Foundation v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R.R., 297 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.
1961).
27 Yeckes-Eichenbaum Inc. v. Texas Mex. R.R., 263 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959).
28 Detroit & T.S.L. R.R. v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
29 United States v. Reading Co., 289 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1961).
30 Elder & Johnston Co. v. Commercial Motor Freight Inc., 94 Ohio App. 358, 115
N.E. 2d 179 (1953).
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Defenses of the Carrier
The common law recognized that damage could occur to shipments
that were entirely outside the control of the carrier. Hence, there were
certain defenses which were afforded the carrier and are still recognized
under the Carmack Amendment.
These are an act of God, such as an earthquake, avalanche and
the like; an act of the public enemy, which means hostile troops, but
not strikers; the fault of the shipper, such as defective loading of
the goods, where the shipper loads; and the natural propensities of
live stock, in case of such shipments, which exempts from injuries
caused through goring, fighting and the like; the last exemption
might be termed exemption through special laws, and refers only to
exemptions in the navigation laws, under which, in certain cases,
a vessel can throw its cargo overboard without incurring any
liability therefor. 31
This article will not dwell at length with the various defenses avail-
able to a carrier. Their proper treatment would alone form the basis
for an entire article. The aforementioned quotation did not fully identify
one defense, namely that a defense lies when the damage was caused by
the inherent vice on the nature of the goods.32 The author of the quo-
tation had merely referred to one type of inherent vice, namely, the
propensity of livestock to damage itself. Perishable commodities, also,
have a nature that requires some additional safeguards, otherwise rot,
mildew, etc., will lead to their destruction. Some discussion of a few
aspects of the defense brought about by the fault of the shipper was
entered into, but in the context that in the presentation of the prima
facie case where there is definite handling by the shipper, he may have
additional burdens while presenting his case.
The most recent case law has concerned itself with the so-called
"inherent" vice defense. This defense will be discussed since the entire
approach to a defense, regardless of which is chosen, has been affected.
One approach in the trial of a suit that a defendant to a freight claim
case might have taken was that once a plaintiff had established a prima
facie case, the carrier would prove that handling by it was proper.33 If
the issue was over compliance with a shipper's instructions the carrier
had only to show that it had complied with the instructions. In a recent
case, Larry's Sandwiches, Inc. v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co.,34 an action lay
for damage to a shipment of frozen sandwiches. The railroad asserted
that it had complied with the shipping instructions and the Perishable
Protective Tariff. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
31 Lust, op. cit. supra note 3 at 333, 335-568; Miller, op. cit. supra note 25 at 115-503.
32 Austin v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 188 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1951).
33 See, Donovan, Freight Claim Litigation-Preparation and Trial of a Freight Claim
Case, 8 The Chronicle 6-19 (Oct. 1962).
34 318 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1963).
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Ninth Circuit reiterated the rule that the Carmack Amendment has
codified the common law and a carrier is an insurer unless the damage
was due to one of the five acknowledged defenses. The court held, how-
ever, that where perishable goods are involved reference must be made
to the tariff.35 In this case the tariff stated that there was no guarantee
as to the condition of perishables. The carrier would merely comply with
the shipper's instructions to "retard deterioration". The tariff also stipu-
lated that the carrier's duty was limited to furnishing, without negli-
gence, reasonable protective service as requested by the shipper. There
was to be no liability for loss either because of the acts of the shipper or
if the directions of a shipper are inadequate. The court, therefore, ruled
that where perishable goods are involved the carrier need only prove
that it had complied with the tariff and the shipper's instructions. There
was no obligation to affirmatively assert the defense of inherent vice.
36
The United States Supreme Court recently had before it the case of
Missouri Pacific Rd. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl,37 which overruled the Ninth
Circuit. This case arose in a Texas court and consisted of jury findings
on special issues. The trial court on the basis of these findings found for




(1) the shipment of melons were in good condition when turned
over to the carrier,
(2) they were damaged upon arrival,
(3) the carriers were not negligent, and
(4) the damage was not due solely to inherent vice.
Since the Texas courts established a rule of law entirely different from
the Ninth Circuit, Certiorari was granted.
The Supreme Court pointed out that with the exception of injury
to livestock, an exception to the common rules regarding defenses to
freight claims based upon the natural propensity of animals to destroy
themselves, the early federal cases did not distinguish between perish-
able and non-perishable goods. The Court found that though a number
of states in the area of intra-state shipments absolved a carrier where he
shows compliance with the tariffs, this is not the federal rule.
35 Ibid. Here the court held that frozen sandwiches are "perishable" as contem-
plated by the tariff.
36 Compare, Illinois Packing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 236 F.2d 907 (7th Cir.
1956); see also cases supra note 3; Missouri P. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, supra note 22.
37 Supra note 22.
38 360 S.W. 2d 839 (1962).
39 368 S.W. 2d 99 (1963).
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It was held that the carrier has the burden of (1) showing no
negligence and (2) that damage was due to an inherent vice. This
ruling is a departure from earlier cases and in effect revolutionizes the
approach a carrier must take in defending a freight claim case.40 The
Court was not persuaded that the carrier lacks adequate means to in-
form itself of the condition of shipments when picked up, but stated that
it was the only one in a position to acquire the knowledge of what actu-
ally damaged a shipment in transit.
Thus, as a result of this decision the carrier must either know or
find out later whether a shipper, for example, who may have decided to
shave its expenses, incorrectly advised the carrier with respect to special
instructions such as icing. Then the carrier must prove the defect was
due to an inherent tendency in the goods to rot, decay, mildew, etc. In
view of the incredible number of varieties of goods shipped, this places
a considerable burden upon a carrier. If a carrier is less than diligent
it may find itself in the business of purchasing spoiled perishables on
hauls where the shipper availed himself of minimum rates.
The dissenters, normally not considered advocates for the carriers'
cause, were Justices Douglas and Black. They pointed out that the ship-
per chose a lesser freight rate and the carrier had performed the duties
that had been ordered and paid for. The dissent referred to the testimony
of the railroad's expert witnesses which indicated that decay originated
at harvesting or packing. Further testimony was introduced to indicate
the decay was due to improper refrigeration. The dissenters held that
the shippers could have chosen more protection had they so desired.
They also felt that the federal rule did distinguish between perishable
and non-perishable goods.
Thus, in their opinion, the Texas courts should have been reversed
and the tariff should have been given the force and effect of a statute.
Liability should have been limited to the service requested, paid for, and
rendered. Hence, a shipper, under the guise of buying transportation
services in effect consummates a sale of produce to the railroad.
The Supreme Court majority failed to consider the overall trans-
portation policy as contemplated in the entire Interstate Commerce Act,
the decisions of the federal courts, the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the published, regulated and approved tariffs. The impact of this
decision places upon the carrier an affirmative obligation not only to
show proper handling and compliance with both its contract of carriage
and the lawful tariff, but also requires it to become an expert with re-
gard to innumerable commodities in order to prove that despite its lack
of negligence the commodity was damaged because it perished due to
its inherent nature.
40 Thomas, Freight Claim Cases, 11 The Chronicle 2-12 (Aug. 1965).
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Thus, the basis of the carrier's liability is not merely negligence.
The rule of convenience which simplified the shipper's prima facie case
has been considerably strengthened. Once that case is made the carrier
now has a considerable burden of proof to sustain in order to effectively
defend the action.
Burden of Proving Damages
The subject of damages like that of a carrier's defenses is an exten-
sive one and has been discussed at length elsewhere. 41 A short comment
is appropriate to indicate who has the burden of proof of damages.
Though this would seem obviously that of the shipper or consignee
claimant, the problem has been the subject of litigation recently.
The general rule is that the measure of damages is determined by
the Interstate Commerce Act and the decisions of the courts of the
United States construing it. 42 Under the Carmack Amendment, as
amended, the courts have found that the common law rule of actual
compensatory damages should prevail. 43 This is true whether the dam-
age is a physical loss 44 or due to a delay.
45
In a recent case40 a shipment of plums was delivered two days late
and the plaintiff contended that since the shipment was late the measure
of damages should be based upon the decline in wholesale market value
between the day the shipment was supposed to arrive and the day it did
arrive. The shipper argued that though the plums were intended for re-
tail sale, it did not keep sufficient records to ascertain the differences in
retail prices. Hence, the plaintiff contended that the burden was on the
railroad to prove that the measuring stick of wholesale value was not the
proper basis of actual loss.
The United States Circuit Court for the Seventh Circuit found that
the plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof in establishing actual
damages. The plaintiff had to prove whether the plums were sold at a
lesser retail price than if they had been delivered on time.
This case was of considerable significance to the railroad industry
and most of the major railroads had a hand in the stipulations that were
utilized in this test case. Fortunately the result left the burden of prov-
ing damages where it should be, with the plaintiff.
41 Miller, op. cit. supra note 25, at 522-805.
42 Missouri P. R.R. v. H. Rouw Co., 258 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1958); cert. denied, 358
U.S. 929 (1959).
43 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57 (1929).
44 Olcovich v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada, 179 Cal. 332, 176 P. 459 (1918). This
case also indicates the problem of whether an item of damages is incidental or com-
pensatory, the prior category being unrecoverable.
45 Cincis v. The New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 149 N.Y.S. 2d 602 (N.Y. City Ct. 1956).
46 The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. The Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 333 F.2d
705 (7th Cir. 1964); cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965).
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The Requirement to File a Written Claim
Early decisions under the Carmack Amendment recognized that a
carrier could contract with a shipper that written notice would be fur-
nished within a given time after the damage was discovered. The Su-
preme Court held that a thirty-six hour period was not unreasonable
with respect to perishable fruit.47
Congress incorporated a provision in the first Cummins Amendment
which set a minimum standard of days that a carrier could choose as
the period in which written notice must be given. This period was set as
ninety days in which notice of a claim must be given. The actual claim
had to be filed within four months. An exception was made to the notice
and filing requirements where the loss was due to damage or delay either
in the loading process or where the carrier was negligent.
Hence, under the 1915 Amendment where a shipper failed to file
notice within four months, he could still prevail if he could show the
railroad was negligent. The railroad, however, insofar as the law stood
at that time rebutted even the ordinary prima facie presentation if it
showed it was not negligent. 48
The present law is that the carrier has nine months after delivery
of the property to require the filing of a written claim. The exceptions
to the filing requirements were also deleted. Hence, the carriers adopted
standard bills of lading which incorporated this provision 49 and further
incorporated the terms in the tariffs which govern particular moves.50
Where a shipper fails to comply with his obligation to file a written
claim he cannot maintain a suit against the carrier.51 Where there is
more than one carload in a lot, even though there is only one bill of
lading for a number of carloads, a written claim must be filed for each
car within nine months after delivery.52
47 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R.R. v. Starbird, 243 U.S. 592 (1916).
48 Chesapeake & 0. R.R. v. Thompson Mfg. Co., 270 U.S. 416 (1926); see also, Delphi
Frosted Foods Corp. v. Illinois C. R.R., 89 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Ky. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d
343 (6th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 833 (1951); keep in mind the discussion of
the latest rulings of the Supreme Court which places the dicta of this Sixth Circuit
case in doubt.
49 Miller, supra note 25, at 34; see Freight Traffic Red Book (1955). Section 2(b) of
the uniform bill of lading form provides: "As a condition precedent to recovery,
claims must be filed in writing with the receiving or delivering carrier, or carrier
issuing this bill of lading, or carrier on whose line the loss, damage, injury or delay
occurred, within nine months after delivery of the property . . . and suits shall be
instituted against any carrier only within two years and one day from the day when
notice in writing is given by the carrier to the claimant that the carrier has dis-
allowed the claim or any part or parts thereof specified in the notice. Where claims
are not filed or suits are not instituted thereon in accordance with the foregoing pro-
visions, no carrier hereunder shall be liable, and such claims will not be paid."
50 For an example see Freight Classification 5, I.C.C. No. A-5, effective Oct. 1, 1959,
as supplemented in Supplement No. 8 effective March 1, 1960.
51 Chesapeake & 0. R.R. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209 (1931).
52 National Distillers Products Corp. v. Companhia Nacional De Navegacao, 99 F.
Supp. 458 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
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This requirement for filing a written claim is mandatory and the
carrier cannot waive it nor by its action be estopped from asserting it.
In a United States Circuit Court of Appeals decision for the Sixth Cir-
cuit53 the contention was made that the carrier had actual notice of the
damage, had waived the filing of a written claim and was estopped from
asserting the defense of such a failure. In this case verbal notice was
given by the plaintiff to the delivering carrier, which in turn had its
agents make an inspection two days after the delivery was accomplished.
The agents made a written report and forwarded a copy to the damaged
party. In addition, the bill of lading returning the shipment to the con-
signor was shipped free of charge and recited "Damaged in transit. Re-
turned free for repairs". A written claim was not filed until fifteen
months after delivery.
In a terse opinion the court set forth the following principles of law:
(1) Federal law makes it mandatory that a claim in writing
must be filed with the carrier within nine months after delivery.
Actual notice by the carrier of the damaged goods is not sufficient
compliance on the part of the damaged party.
(2) The carrier may not waive or be estopped to assert the re-
quirements of the bill of lading as this would permit discrimination
which is prohibited by law.54
The aforementioned rule of law prevails in more United States Cir-
cuit Courts than the dissimilar rule of the Seventh Circuit enunciated
in Hopper Paper Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. 55 In that case no writ-
ten claim was filed. The shipper nonetheless prevailed. The facts, how-
ever, were quite overt and if ever the established rule of law was to be
breached this case was loaded on the side of the shipper. The plaintiff
in this case was the consignor of a load of paper for delivery to the
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. The bill of lading con-
tained the usual language with respect to filing a written claim within
nine months.5 While the shipment was in transit there was a derailment
involving two Baltimore & Ohio Railway Company trains. The railroad
took the salvaged paper and sold it for $100.00 sans acquiescence or even
knowledge on the part of the consignor. Two days later the railroad
notified both consignor and consignee of the destruction of the paper.
Approximately eleven months after this notice a written claim for the
damage was made.
The Seventh Circuit Court held that in a case similar to the facts
in this case the requirement to file a written notice is not necessary
53 Walterman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 295 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1961).
54 Id. at 628; see also, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pioneer Products, 256 F.2d 431 (5th
Cir. 1958); East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. United States, 239 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.
1956); Northern P. R.R. v. Mackie, 195 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1952).
55 178 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1949).
56 Section 2(b), supra note 49.
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where the carrier ". . . has or is chargeable with actual knowledge of all
the conditions as to the damages that a written notice could give".
57
The court urged that the purpose of the written claim provision was not
to escape liability but to facilitate prompt investigation. The argument
that this decision would open the doors to discrimination and preferences
was rejected and the court commented that the mode of proof was avail-
able to shipper and carrier alike.
The facts in the Hopper case were indeed unusual, the legal rationale
equally so. Since the damage that occurred was occasioned by a derail-
ment, ordinary negligence would easily be established by the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.5  The further twist in the case is found in the sale
of the lading by the carrier. Though counsel for the carrier cited numer-
ous cases which should have convinced the court that it had diverged
from the tenor and spirit of the National Transportation Policy, this
court would not accept them. It made a remark, however, that its de-
cision was made because of the peculiar facts of the case before it. It is
for this reason that the Hopper decision has for the most part been lim-
ited to its quite unusual facts. 59
The Hopper case has been followed where a carrier admitted
liability with full knowledge of its agent along with an oral claim on the
theory of a substantial compliance with the terms of the bill of lading.60
From the language of the past Hopper decisions it is apparent that
there is a broad split of opinion among the Circuits and on this basis
a case should eventually be certified to the United States Supreme Court
from which one might expect to find another novel principle of law.
This split, however, is in the cases where (1) there is actual knowl-
edge by the carrier and (2) admitted liability by the carrier, or in the
case of Hopper a "sure thing" negligence situation. The additional fact
of a sale of the lading by the carrier certainly aids a shipper who wishes
to come under the exceptions where they are recognized. A full conver-
sion of the lading by the carrier will, without invoking a Hopper excep-
tion, exempt the shipper from the written claim requirement.6 1
Though sufficient authority lies for the rule that a carrier may not
waive the written claim requirement nor be estopped from asserting it,
the United States Supreme Court left open the door in a 1931 decision
and stated:
57 Hopper v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., supra note 55, at 181.
58 Fink v. New York Cent. R.R., 144 Ohio St. 1, 56 N.E. 2d 456 (1944).
59 East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. United States, supra note 54; Northern P. R.R.
v. Mackie, supra note 54; Delphi Frosted Foods v. Illinois Cent. R.R., supra note 48;
Penn. State Laundry Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 134 F. Supp. 955 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
60 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pioneer Products, supra note 54; Loveless v. Universal
Carloading & Distributing Co., 225 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1955), wherein Judge Wallace
dissented considering Hooper, "a maverick decision on its law and facts." Written
notice was considered given by the fact of the carrier's written rejection of the claim.
61 Dowling v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 108 S.C. 186, 93 S.E. 863 (1917).
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Whether under any circumstances the shipper may rely upon
that doctrine [estoppel] in avoidance of the time limitation clause
of the bill of lading, we need not now determine.
62
Through that "opened door" walked Hopper and other cases which
cast a shadow of insecurity in absolute reliance upon the requirements
of the bill of lading. The trend in the law seems to indicate more liberal-
ity in interpretation of the law as opposed to that great body of law
which strove for a uniform rigidity in the construction and application
of the Interstate Commerce Act which aims at facilitating the flow of
commerce.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has said that:
The federal courts have been consistent in holding that local
rules of estoppel will not be permitted to thwart the purposes of
statutes of the United States.6
3
If the Court continues to adhere to this philosophy the encroach-
ments made by Hopper and other cases will be left as cul de sacs or pos-
sibly overruled.
Once it is established that a written claim must be filed some con-
sideration must be given to what constitutes a claim. A New York State
case which has been cited frequently and which based its determination
upon federal law set out the essential elements of a claim in writing:
• . . in order to constitute a claim the transfer agency should
be advised by the consignor or the consignee that, first, a loss has
occurred, second, the nature of the loss, third, the nature of the
shipment involved, fourth, the approximate date of the shipment
and its point of origin and destination, and finally, that the parties
to the shipment expect restitution or reimbursement.
64
The form of the claim is not important. Thus, a telegram which
made a claim was sufficient. 65 Likewise, a written intention to make
a claim in the future was proper.66
Though an exception was made in a case following the Hopper
rationale where liability was admitted by the carrier and, therefore, the
written communication to the shipper served the purpose of the written
claim,6 7 the inspection report of the carrier is generally not a sufficient
compliance for the requirement of a written claim.68 Handing an invoice
62 Chesapeake & 0. R.R. v. Martin, supra note 51, at 222.
63 Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
64 Bond Stores v. Overland Package Freight Service, 13 N.Y.S. 2d 928 (N.Y. Mun. Ct.
1939).
65 Georgia, F. & A. R.R. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916).
66 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R.R. v. Starbird, supra note 47; Delaware, L. & W. R.R. v.
United States, 123 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
67 Loveless v. Universal Carloading & Distributing Co., supra note 60.
68 Union P. R.R. v. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 253 P.2d 437 (Colo. 1953); Texas
& N. 0. R.R. v. McNatt, 223 S.W. 2d 651 (Civ. App. Tex. 1949); Louisville & N. R.R.
v. Home Fruit & Produce Co., 310 Ky. 269, 220 S.W. 2d 558 (1949).
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indicating expected costs of repairs to the carrier's agent who inspected
the damaged shipment is not a "written claim"; 9 nor is a mere list of
damaged items without an amount claimed. 70
Either the consignor or the consignee may make the claim.7 1 A
designated agent can also make the claim on behalf of the shipper.7 2 The
claim must be filed against the carrier and must be specific enough so
that it is clear against whom the claim is filed. 73 Hence, a claim filed
with the Railroad Perishable Inspection Agency is invalid.74
It is apparent from this discussion that though the courts are lenient
in interpreting a document as a written claim, nonetheless counsel for
a shipper must watch out for the numerous pitfalls that may befall a
shipper who fails to apprise himself of the nature of the claim required. 75
Freight Forwarders
The freight forwarder is in the business of assembling less than car-
load shipments and then shipping them as carload shipments indicating
destinations where the shipments are broken up and ultimately deliv-
ered to various consignees. The freight forwarder is regulated by federal
law7 6 and does not as a rule transport goods himself, but relies for a
profit on the difference between "LCL" and carload rates. The freight
forwarder issues a bill of lading to the individual shipper. The railroad
who receives the shipment issues a second bill of lading naming the for-
warder as both the consignor and consignee. The carrier is unaware of
69 Lucas Machine Div., New Britain Mach. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 236 F. Supp.
281 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
70 Insurance Co. of North America v. Newtowne Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 675 (1st Cir.
1951); Berg v. Schreiber, 337 Ill. App. 477, 86 N.E. 2d 125 (1949); cert. den-ed, 340
U.S. 851 (1950).
71 United Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 323 Mass. 354, 82 N.E. 2d
215 (1948); carrier prevailed, however, for the only letter received was one inquiring
after the shipment.
72 Franck v. Railway Express Agency, 159 Ohio St. 343, 112 N.E. 2d 381 (1953). This
case also involves an exception to the general prerequisites for establishing a prima
facie case in the case where there is live stock accompanied by the shipper's agent
under a contract arrangement.
73 Louda v. Prague Assurance-National Corp., 347 Ill. App. 211, 106 N.E. 2d 757
(1952).
74 James G. McGarrick Co. v. Thompson, 227 S.W. 2d 832 (Civ. App. Tex. 1950).
75 Annot., 175 A.L.R. 1162 (1948).
76 49 U.S.C. § 1002 (a) (5) (1964) defines a forwarder as "any person which . . . holds
itself out to the general public . . . to transport or provide transportation of property
... and which, in the ordinary and usual course of its undertaking, (A) assembles
and consolidates or provides for assembling and consolidating shipments of such
property, and performs or provides for the performance of break-bulk and distribut-
ing operations with respect to such consolidated shipments, and (B) assumes respon-
sibility for the transportation of such property from point of receipt to point of des-
tination, and (C) utilizes, for the whole or any part of the transportation of such
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the identity of the individual shipper or the various intended ultimate
destinations.
The question then is whether a freight forwarder who has received
a claim from his shipper has a right against the carrier under the Car-
mack Amendment and, if so, whether recovery is subject to the terms
of the bill of lading issued by the railroad. These terms would, of course,
include the requirement to file a written claim.
The United States Supreme Court held that vis a vis the railroad,
the freight forwarder is a shipper and must process its claim according-
ly.7 7 By making the Carmack Amendment applicable to freight for-
warders Congress required them to issue bills of lading and made a
federal law out of a uniform application of state law relating to liability
for loss or damage. The passage of the Carmack Amendment instituted
a significant change as far as the railroad industry was concerned since
they could not limit liability to their own lines. The freight forwarder,
however, even under the common law was liable for loss or damage to
the consignment occurring at any time between pick up and destination.
The Court held that the freight forwarder is not in an unequal
position because the provision of the Interstate Commerce Act which
allows the initial or delivering carrier to recover against the intermediate
or connecting carrier 7s does not apply to freight forwarders. The reason
ascribed to explain no injustice was that the railroads simply do not
avail themselves of that provision of the act.
If the freight forwarder were not held to a strict compliance with
the established tariffs and the bill of lading he could contract to limit his
liability with the railroad on its bill of lading and when sued by a ship-
per on the bill of lading between the shipper and forwarder sans limita-
tion pay the full amount to the shipper and then proceed against the rail-
road even though a lower rate had been paid. The tenor of the Transpor-
tation Act would be vitiated since the freight forwarder would, in the
opinion of the Court, receive discriminatory treatment as compared to
other shippers. The freight forwarder is much like any other shipper
since it can pick and choose a carrier.
The problem then remains in the situation where the "LCL" shipper
waits to the last minute before he makes his claim against the freight
forwarder. The forwarder, therefore, has a limited time in which to
assert his written claim according to his bill of lading.79 The Court
found that this type of situation constituted an insignificant portion of
77 Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R.R. v. Acme Fast Freight Inc., 336 U.S. 465 (1948).
78 49 U.S.C. § 20 (12) (1964).
79 49 U.S.C. § 20 (11) (1964); § 2(b) uniform bill of lading form, supra note 49, pro-
vides for two years and a day. It should be observed that the Carmack Amendment
merely states a minimum period that the carrier may contract for as an agreed stat-
ute of limitations.
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the claims filed and the Interstate Commerce Commission could pre-
scribe an appropriate remedy should this become significant.
Baggage Claims
Though the Carmack Amendment, as amended, prohibits a carrier
from limiting its liability for loss to freight by contract, there are two
exceptions allowed by the law.
The first exception involves the transportation of items, other than
livestock, for which the Interstate Commerce Commission has issued an
order. The Commission, therefore, is empowered to allow rates varying
with the declared or agreed value which it finds to be fair and reason-
able. These rates are called "released" rates80 and are used most com-
monly for the movement of household goods.
8
'
The second class of exception from the rule prohibiting the limita-
tion of liability by the use of "stated value" is in the area of baggage
which is carried on boats or trains carrying passengers. In an action
before the Supreme Court for lost baggage8 2 the carrier had filed a tariff
which included an express valuation rate. The Court ruled that the rate
when made and filed is notice even though it is not posted in the station.
It held also that the provisions of the tariff had become part of the con-
tract of shipment and where the owner of the baggage failed to choose
another rate allowing him to state the actual value, the rate set out in
the tariff applied along with its provision limiting liability.
The majority stated with respect to the filing of a tariff: "The effect
of such filing is to permit the carrier by such regulations to obtain com-
mensurate compensation for the responsibility assumed for the safety of
the passenger's baggage .... ,, 83 The tariff before the Court required a
passenger seeking more protection for his baggage to declare the value
and pay an excess amount. The Court reasoned that this alternative was
prudent since the value of the contents of the baggage was peculiarly
within the knowledge of the passenger. The Court pointed out that if the
charges filed are unreasonable the course of attack should be made in
proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Court
sanctioned the use of baggage receipts instead of a formal bill of lading.
Justice Pitney dissented on the grounds that the regulations and tariff
provisions were not known to the shipper. The theory of the dissenter
has never become law. If it would prevail it is apparent that the spirit
of the Transportation Act which strives for a rigid uniformity of appli-
cation in order to benefit both carrier and shipper would be vitiated and
80 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1964).
81 Miller, supra note 25, at 681-723.
82 Boston and M. R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (1914).
83 Id. at 119.
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each damage action would be determined and settled on an ad hoc basis,
requiring litigation whether there was proper notice.
In a recent case8 4 a salesman asked a "red cap" to stay and watch
his bag. The "red cap" conducted his duties in a desultory manner and
consequently was not present when the bag was stolen. The bag con-
tained $50,000 worth of jewelry. The court found that the services of
the "red cap" were in furtherance of interstate travel. Under the Car-
mack Amendment the carrier is not an insurer as such. The statutes as
they relate to this situation do not confer new remedial rights upon the
shipper as in the instance where liability was imposed upon the initial
carrier.8 5 The substantive rights which flow from the statute are not
novel, but rather reflect the doctrines enunciated in the common law.
Under the common law a carrier is liable as an insurer only for such
goods as it holds itself out to handle. In this case, a salesman's sample
case is not mere "baggage" and its care extends beyond a "red cap's"
duties to passengers.
Baggage has been defined as "... such articles of apparel, ornament
... as are in daily use by travelers for convenience, comfort, or recrea-
tion." 86 Where an item shipped falls within the definition of "baggage"
federal law controls. Hence, in a situation where a trunk was missing
liability was limited to declared value. This rule applies unless an actual
conversion could be proven against the carrier.87
The requirement that an agreed value in writing shall prevail does
not require a signature. The knowledge of the passenger-shipper that
the rate is based upon the value is presumed from the bill of lading and
the published schedules filed with the Commission. Since the Interstate
Commerce Act is replete with penalties for failure to comply with the
law, there is a presumption that the tariff which is relied upon by the
carrier was duly approved by the Commission. 8 Collateral evidence to
the contract of carriage would merely reward the passenger who under-
values his baggage.
In the case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Robinson,8 9
a race horse qualified as baggage under the facts of the case. The shipper
of the race horse had obtained a verbal commitment that the horse would
be loaded at a certain time and be shipped on a certain railway. The
shipper was then assured that the horse would arrive on time for a given
race. The car was not moved on the night indicated that it would be
84 J&H Flyer Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 316 F.2d 203 (2nd Cir. 1963).
85 Id. at 205.
86 S. Nathan & Co. v. Red Cab Inc., 118 F.2d 864, 867 (7th Cir. 1941); cert. denied, 314
U.S. 642 (1941).
87 Van Dyke v. Pennsylvania R.R., 46 Del. 529, 86 A. 2d 346 (1952).
88 American Railway Express Co. v. Lindenburg, 260 U.S. 584 (1923).
89 233 U.S. 173 (1914).
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and the horse consequently arrived at its destination too late for the
races. A secondary aspect of damages occurred because not only was
the horse delayed, it was also seriously injured during the shipment.
The plaintiff argued that it had an oral contract which guaranteed the
shipment and further argued that no mention was made of any particular
valuation of the horse. The defendant relied upon the provisions of the
tariff which did not guarantee a delivery date, and further limited
liability to a stated value. The court held that the shipper was bound
by the published tariffs, notwithstanding the fact that there may have
been a misrepresentation and that the shipper probably was unaware of
the terms of the tariff. The court stated that ". . . if oral agreements of
this character can be sustained, then the door is open to all manner of
special contracts, departing from the schedules and rates filed with the
Commission." 90 In dicta the court indicated that a different rule might
apply if there was an attempt on the part of the carrier to get around
the published rates by a fraudulent agreement showing false billing of
the property. This case was, of course, governed by the Carmack
Amendment under the concept of pre-caption.
In the aforementioned case the plaintiff had not pressed for damages
for the delay. The law with respect to this aspect of damages is that in
a situation where there is no tariff authority for the guarantee of the
arrival date of a given car, and there is no unreasonable delay, then a
carrier is not liable upon a promise to deliver in a shorter period than
reasonably expeditious transportation would require.91 An action does
not lie for mental suffering for delay in shipment,92 and this issue was
not presented in the aforementioned race horse case.
Hence, it is clear that any oral representation which deviates from
the tariff is of no effect. Thus, in a case where an oral agreement was
made between passengers and a railroad's baggagemen to ship baggage
on a given train, the railroad was not liable for failure to deliver the
baggage in time to enable the passengers to fulfill an ocean cruise. The
baggage had been forwarded on a following train, but the railroad's bag-
gage tariff had reserved the right to forward the baggage on the pre-
ceding or following train.9 3
The choice of a stated value lies entirely with the passenger. The
legality of the contract for reduced rates depends upon the propriety of
the rates filed and not upon a valuation which has a relationship to the
true value of the property.94
90 Id. at 181.
91 Kirchner v. New York Cent. R.R., 94 N.E. 2d 283 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
92 Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612 (1916).
93 Steindl v. New York Cent. R.R., 296 Ill. App. 70, 15 N.E. 2d 899 (1938).
94 Pierce v. Wells Fargo Co., 236 U.S. 278 (1915).
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Statute of Limitations
Where a shipper has complied with the written claim requirements
of the bill of lading, he must commence his suit within two years after
the rejection of his claim. This rejection need not be formal. In a case
where a claim was made for one sum and the carrier stated it would pay
a lesser sum, even though negotiations continued, the written disallow-
ance begins the period of limitations and the statute of limitations will
not be tolled. 95 This rejection of a claim will start the period of limita-
tions running even if it is sent to the shipper's attorneys rather than the
shipper himself.9 6
A carrier, discovering that its shipper-who incidentally may be a
very lucrative source of freight revenue-has slipped up and has let the
statute of limitations expire, may not waive the statute and must assert
it.97 The reason for this rule is to avoid discrimination and avoid award-
ing preferences by in effect consenting to a judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
Congress has extended original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under the Interstate Commerce Acts to the federal district
courts.9 " Thus, regardless of the amount in controversy a case involving
the Carmack Amendment may be brought in a federal court. Even
though a small amount of money is involved the federal court is the
proper forum.99
This rule is not a carte blanche as to the choice of forum among the
various federal courts. Aside from the change of venue provisions of the
United States Code,100 the Carmack Amendment itself specifies that ac-
tions against a delivering carrier shall be brought in a district (where a
federal court is involved) or in a state (in a state court case) where the
carrier operates a line of railroad.1 1
A shipper may sue in a state court, 10 2 however, where the amount
exceeds $3000.00 the case may be removed to a federal district court.
It is interesting to note that though the jurisdictional amount in the
usual diversity cases has been raised to an excess of $10,000.00,103 the
freight claim remains at $3000.00.
95 Burns v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R.R., 100 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
96 San Lorenzo Nursery Co. v. Western Carloading Co., 91 F. Supp. 553 (S.D. N.Y.
1950).
97 A. J. Phillips v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 236 U.S. 662 (1915).
98 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964).
99 Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, 316 U.S. 350 (1942).
1o0 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1964).
101 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1964).
102 Nelms, Kehoe & Nelms v. Davis, 277 Fed. 982 (S.D. Texas 1921); see also, Nelms,
Kehoe & Nelms v. Davis, 277 Fed. 987 (S.D. Texas 1921).
103 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
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Conclusion
The entire area of law regarding interstate commerce has the pri-
mary purpose of carrying out the National Transportation Policy of Con-
gress. The Carmack Amendment, as amended, is only a part of a much
larger act and, therefore, a myopic view of just its provisions is out of
the question if one is to properly understand the cases which have inter-
preted the Carmack Amendment. Occasionally some courts fail to view
the Act as a whole and have developed a rule of law that concerns itself
more with the equities of one case than the general policy of the entire
Act. A stringent, uniform rule of law paradoxically does create some
unjust results, however, the pragmatic difficulties that are obviated are
legion. To assert oral agreements and acts of estoppel would open the
door to excessive litigation and grant ample opportunity to create prefer-
ences.
The railroads are not at a great disadvantage because of the impo-
sition of liability upon the initial or delivering carrier. The fact that the
law affords them a remedy against the connecting carrier 0 4 is not the
balm, but rather the fact that long ago the railroads entered into an
agreement to handle claims among themselves. 0 5 This industry solution
has aided both carrier and shipper alike.
An appeal for rigidity, however, must not be taken on an entirely
literal basis. Despite the statutory nature of this area of the law, no
statute can avoid the human element and provide for every exigency.
Overt actions on the part of the railroads may deprive them of some of
the permissive contractual provisions they employ. 10 6
The rule, however, should be to strive for stringency and the excep-
tions should be very rare even though at times the two edged sword
sometimes bites into both shipper and carrier alike. The law, after all,
is there to maintain harmony and facility in the prodigious, rapid flow
of commerce.
104 49 U.S.C. § 20 (12) (1964).
105 See, Rules of Order, Principles and Practices, Freight Claim Rules, Association of
American Railroads, Operations and Maintenance Dept., Freight Claim Division.
106 New York, N. H. & H. R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128 (1952).
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